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1. SUMMARY: The CAl, apparently contrary to several other 
'"""\ 
/( 
circuits, has held that parents who unilaterally place their 
handicapped child in a private school may later recover tui~ion 
costs under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act. 
2. FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW: Resp Robert Panico is the 
( parent of a child with learning disabilities, Michael. Michael 
was attending public school under an individualized educational 
f +~~ ,u-to~ tt tjttt.W- CJll\.. ~ I ~ .. S", ~ -h ll.Li~~ 
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plan (IEP) drawn pursuant to the Education for All Handicapped 
Children Act (EAHCA). Michael continued to experience learning 
difficulties, however, and in 1979, near the close of his third-
grade year, school officials prepared a~~~J)placing Michael 
/' (_ ..,.... 
at a different public school. The Panicos were dissatisfied with 
----· 
this plan ano sought review by the state Department of Education. 
I 
Prior to the commencement· of hearings in September, the Panicos 
transferred Michael to a private school for learning-disabled 
children. 
In January, 1980, the state hearing officer held that petr's 
~
~was inadequate and inappropriate, and ordered pe~~pay 
1/ ,, 
both past and future tuition at Michael's private school. Petr 
----------------------------·~· ----~---------~ 
then filed suit in the D. Mass., seeking to reverse the state 
1~dministrative or~~'on the basis of both the EAHCA and a~ogous 
state law. The DC denied a stay of the order requiring payment 
and entered summary judgment in favor of the Panicos and the 
state on the state-law count. 
Meanwhile, Michael remained in private school and no further 
IEPs were drawn. In February, 1981, petr agreed, under threat of 
a funding cut-off, to pay for Michael's education at the private 
school for the 1980-81 schdbl year and prospectively, but refused 
to reimburse the Panicos for tuition costs for the 1979-80 school 
~--, 
year. 
~tr appealed the DC rulings to the CAl. 
v. Dept of Education, 655 F.2d 428 (CAl 1981). 
Town of Burlington 
The ~1 dismissed 
the state count on the merits, holding that the state-law 




preempted. The CAl upheld the order requiring petr to pay 
prospective tuition costs, but held that petr did not have to pay 
(P~~5{ until~~erits were finally adjudicated. The 
federal claim was remanded for trial. 
~ ··- · -· - ----... 
On remand, the DC reversed the state administrative order 
'----------------------------------------~ 
and held that petr's IEP was adequate and appropriate. Petr, as 
--------- - -
the prevailing party, was held entitled to reimbursement for 
tuition, transportation costs, and other expenses related to 
~ 
---------~ 
Michael's education at the private school for prior years. 
The Panicos and the state appealed. TJ e CAl h~ that the 
DC had failed to give sufficient deference to the state 
administrative proceedings and remanded for further 
consideration. The CAl held that, although a federal 
not award relief on the basis of violations of state law, the --
federal law in question the EAHCA -- incorporated state ------------
s~s. In this case the DC merely ruled the numerous 
findings of the state hearing officer regarding violations of 
state law "irrelevant." The findings should have been reviewed 
as bearing on he federal right to an appropriate education. 
The CAl also discussed the question of reimbursement, which 
was bound to arise on remand. Petr argued that the Panicos 
were barred from any reimbursement relief because they had 
enrolled Michael in private school prior to the conclusion of the 
state administrative proceedings. This action, petr contended, 




During the pendency of any proceedings conducted 
pursuant to this section, unless the State or local 
educational agency and the parents or guardian 
otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then 
current educational placement of such child, .•• 
until all such proceedings have been completed. 
The ~Al recognized that three circuits have held that 
... "' =-- '"' parents are not entitled to reimbursement if they ~nilaterally 
--------------'---------------------------~ move a child to private school while proceedings are 
See Mt. View-Los Altos United High School District v. Sharron 
B.H., 709 F.2d 28 (CA9 1983) : ~emple v. Board of Education, 623 
F.2d 8934~ cert. denied, 450 u.s. 911 (1981); Monahan 
v. Nebraska, 645 F.2d 592, 598 (1980). The CAl had already 
departed from Stemple -- the leading case -- and joined the CA7 
in holding that §1415(e) (3) established "a strong preference, but 
( not a statutory duty, for maintenance of the status quo." See 
( 
Doe v. Brookline, 722 F.2d 910, 918, citing Anderson v. Thompson, 
v 
658 F.2d 1205, 1209 (CA7 1981). The CA4 in Stemple had 
overlooked legislative history indicating that Congress saw the 
need for flexibility in applying the EAHCA. The CA4's rule 
exalted "form over substance because parents are barred from 
reimbursement if they change the child's placement at all prior 
to the termination of all proceedings, regardless of whether they 
rely on expert advice or a state agency decision in their favor, 
and even though the school system is held not to have proposed an 
appropriate education for the child." A better rule was to allow 
reimbursement if the parents' actions are held to be appropriate 
at final judgment. If, however, the school system proposed and 
had the capacity to implement an appropriate IEP, reimbursement 




gain an agreement with the school system before moving the child, 
their failure to negotiate might be taken into account as a 
factor weighing against reimbursement. 
The CAl further held that, when parents have relied on a 
state administrative decision in their favor in placing their 
child in a private school, a local education agency may not 
obtain reimbursement from them even if it ultimately prevails in 
court. In this case, however, the Panicos could not have relied 
on the state administrative decision until it issued, in January 
1980. Accordingly, they could not claim immunity from 
reimbursement for amounts petr had expended before that date. 
Nor could they do so for any time period subsequent to the period 
covered by the state administrative order. 
Finally, the CAl held that if petr's procedural violations 
amounted to "bad faith," petr might be barred from collecting any 
reimbursement from the parents. 
Petr requested rehearing and rehearing en bane. This was 
denied. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petrs: (1) The CAl erred in declining to 
follow the CA4, CAS and CA9 on the question of reimbursement. 
First, the Stemple rule followed by these other circuits is not 
as inflexible as the CAl believed. Parents may change the 
placement while proceedings are pending provided that the local 
or state authorities agree to the change. Second, local 
educational authorities are subject to serious financial 
( sanctions for violating the EAHCA and will not routinely 






injunction before the completion of state administrative 
proceedings, if federal rights will be irreparably damaged. 
Fourth, Congress chose to prohibit self-help explicitly in 
§l415(e) (3), and it could have had any number of good reasons for 
doing so. ~ 
(2) Th~l relied on the view that Massachusetts provides 
enforceable procedural and substantive rights for a learning-
disabled child independent of federal law. The CAl ruled that 
under Massachusetts law, local school authorities that have 
complied with the EAHCA may nevertheless be compelled to pay for 
a child's private education if they have departed from state-
mandated policies. If Massachusetts had adopted such a rule, it 
would conflict with federal law, which favors "mainstreaming" of 
handicapped children whenever possible. 
(3) The CAl erroneously restricted testimony by persons who 
testified or could have testified at the administrative hearing. 
(4) The law of the case requires that petrs, as prevailing 
parties, are entitled to reimbursement for amounts expended on 
Michael's tuition and related expenses. 
( 5) h
/ . 
Even apart from the law of the case, t e Pan1cos are 
not entitled to damages. Every other CA that has considered the 
issue, with the possible exception of the CA7, has held that 
there is no right to damages under the EAHCA. See Marvin H. v. 
Austin Independent School District, 714 F.2d 1348, 1356 (CAS 
1983): Powell v. Defore, 699 F.2d 1078, 1081 (CAll 1983): Miener 
( v. Missouri, 673 F.2d 969, 979 (CAS), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 
215 (1982). A bright-line rule prohibiting self-help is far 
( 
-7-
preferable to the equitable considerations outlined by the CAl, 
which will only lead to "Byzantine distinctions." Damages are 
inappropriate under the EAHCA even when parents have relied on a 
favorable state administrative ruling, as here; §1415(e) (3) 
requires that no change in placement occur until state or local 
school authorities agree to this. 
(6) Because the Panicos refused to cooperate in any effort 
to compose an IEP for the years subsequent to 1979-80, they are 
not entitled to any reimbursement for those years. The CAl held 
that petr should have continued to prepare IEPs for Michael while 
review proceedings were pending, but failed to explain how it 
could have done this when the Panicos refused to make Michael or 
his school records available for evaluation. -- - ~ 
Resps: (1) The questions presented ar~not r~ 
ruling on reimbursement is entirely dependen~~r 
The CA's 
the 
Panicos prevail on remand. Even if they prevail, the CA simply 
discussed factors to be considered by the DC in the exercise of 
its discretion. The CA's ruling on the admissibility of evidence 
is similarly unripe: even if erroneous, it may be harmless to 
petr if petr ultimately prevails. 
I 
(2) Each of the questions presented involves the exercise 
~~~---------~----~~~~~~ of discretionary judgment by the lower courts, and this Court 
does not ordinarily grant cert to review such questions. The CA 
characterized the appropriateness of reimbursement as an 
equitable question. On the evidentiary question, this is an area 






the case" argument fails for similar reasons. In any event, what 
petrs characterize as "law of the case" was merely dictum. 
(3) The CAl's holding that reimbursement may be available 
to the prevailing party under the EAHCA does not conflict with 
decisions of other CAs. The CAl held that retroactive 
reimbursement may be awarded to the prevailing party as damages 
under §1415(e) (2), and then set forth circumstances under which 
such an award would not be appropriate. This equitable approach 
is generally in accord with that of other CAs. The cases petr 
cites as being in conflict have not considered the availability 
of reimbursement at the conclusion of judicial proceedings. The 
CA2 and CA3 have considered the issue of interim funding during 
the pendency of an appeal. See Vander Malle v. Ambach, 673 F.2d 
49, 52 (CA2 1982); Grymes v. Madden, 672 F.2d 321, 323 (CA3 
1982). The CA4 and CAS dealt only with reimbursement to parents 
who unilaterally transferred their child to a private school 
during the pendency of proceedings. See Stemple, supra; Stacy G. 
v. Pasadena Ind. Sch. Dist., 695 F.2d 949, 953-54 (CAS 1983). 
The CAB and CAll have addressed only the availability of 
compensatory and punitive damages where a child has remained in 
an inappropriate placement. Powell, supra; Miener, supra. The 
law in this area is still evolving, and certiorari should be 
eschewed in favor a series of CA decisions. 
(4) The CA was correct in remanding to the DC for 
consideration of petr's procedural violations, even if they were 
( in part violations of state law. This Court has recognized the 
importance of the EAHCA's procedural safeguards. Board of 
. 




Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 205-06 {1982). The CA's 
guidelines on the admissibility of evidence additional to that 
presented at the administrative hearing are consistent with 
Rowley's requirement that administrative proceedings be given due 
weight. 
4. DISCUSSION: Petrs' claims concernin~eimbursement and ? 
damages are the only ones that appear to be cert-worthy, and they --- - ----- ------also appear to be closely related. The CAl discussed the issue 
solely in terms of "reimbursement," not "damages," and even petr 
-- although addressing the two points separately -- appears to 
equate them. See petn at 24. The "reimbursement" cases appear 
to be a subset of the "damages" cases that have been decided 
under §1415{e) {2), a provision that allows aggrieved parties to 
bring a civil action, and a district court to "grant such relief 
as [it] determines is appropriate." According to resp, 
"reimbursement" is limited to tuition and related expenses, while 
"damages" encompasses compensatory and punitive damages, which 
are not at issue here. See, e.g., Marvin H., supra {parents 
sought recovery of expenses for private psychiatric counseling 
and hospitalization). Cf. Anderson v. Thompson, supra {parents 
were complying in part with §1415{e) {3) by keeping child half-
time in current placement and half-time in private school, so 
question was availability of "damages" rather than 
"reimbursement"). 
In any event, the holdings in both kinds of cases appear 
contrary to at least the spirit of the CAl hot ding, and in some 
------------- -----





correct that many of them can be distinguished, but the CAl 
itself perceived that it was rejecting the rule of the CA4, CA8 
and possibly the CA9. Moreover, resps' attempt to distinguish 
the CA4 and CAS cases is not successful: those courts have 
during the pendency of proceedings, without the f the 
~~ ----------~--~~~-
local school authorities, they are barred from 
reimbursement. See Stacey G., 695 F.2d at 954; Stemple, 623 F.2d 
at 898. The CAl rule would allow (although apparently would not 
require) reimbursement if the parents ultimately prevail on the 
merits, or if they were acting in reliance on an administrative 
determination that is ultimately overturned. 
The CAl is, however, the first court to perceive........-a ~it" 
on this question. Most courts at least purport to follow the CA7 
opinion in Anderson, which held that damages under the EAHCFA are 
not within the scope of "appropriate" relief absent "exceptional 
circumstances." Parents might be justified in resorting to self-
~
help only if the child's physical health were endangered, or if 
the school district acted in bad faith by failing to comply with 
the procedural provisions of §1415 in an egregious fashion. 
Judge Swygert, the author of Anderson, was a member of the CAl 
panel below, and the opinion cites Anderson with approval. But 
the CA9 also relied on Anderson in refusing to allow 
reimbursement to a parent who had unilaterally placed a child in 
private school before a final determination had been made. 






cited Mountain View-Los Altos as contrary authority. See Petn at 
127A n.31. 
Resp's arguments concerning unripeness and the desirability 
of allowing this issue to percolate among the lower courts are 
unconvincing. While it is true that the CA merely outlined 
factors for the DC to consider, the appropriateness of those 
factors is a question of law that is severable from their 
application to the facts of this case. The case has now been 
remanded twice, and if the CAl's factors are ultimately 
determined to be erroneous on another appeal it will be remanded 
yet a third time. It is also true, as resps argue, that a clear 
circuit split has not yet "crystallized," but I'm not sure that a 
"let a hundred flowers bloom" approach is desirable. The issue 
is obviously a complex one, and I think the lower courts would 
welcome some guidance from this Court. On the other hand, the 
lower courts may eventually arrive at a synthesis of Stemple, 
Anderson and the rule set forth in this case. The CA4 was 
recently urged to overrule Stemple. Hessler v. State Board of 
Education, 700 F.2d 134, 139 (CA4 1983). The court found it 
unnecessary to reach the question whether Stemple was an 
"absolute bar to recovery whenever there is a unilateral 
placement choice by parents," but noted that an "exception" to 
Stemple was recognized in Anderson, and that one DC had declined 
to follow Stemple. It is possible that the CA4 will choose to 
reconsider or modify Stemple in an appropriate case, possibly 







As for petr ' s other claim( (~ -~ 4) _and ( 6) are __ fa~d . 
Claim (2) appears exaggerated: r he CA did n;t-h~ld-that state 
law standards should govern instr ad of federal law standards, but 
rather that violations of state regulations "are material and 
relevant to the determination of \ whether the federal right to a 
I 
I 
free appropriate public educatio~ has been provided under the 
I 
\ 
IEP." It specifically addressed ~etr's argument that state 
standards might conflict with the federal "mainstreaming" policy, 
and held that a state standard that conflicted with that policy 
could not be enforced. Petn at llla n.l9. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend a grant limited to 
questions (1) and (5). 
There is a response. 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
To: Justice Powell March 14, 1985 
From: Annmarie 
Re: No. 84-433 
School Committee of Burlington et al v. Mass. Dep't of 
Educ. et al 
To be argued Tuesday, March 26, 1985 
Questions Presented 
II \' 
(1) Does §1415(e) (2) of the Education of the Handicapped 
,C. 
Act [the ERA] authorize the award of damages to reimburse parents 
~ - - -
for tuition if it is determined that the appropriate educational 
1 -~f h .,4~h'ld · . ~ t h 1? p acement or t e1r c 1 1s 1n a pr1va e sc oo . 
A 
( 2) Is the award of such damages bar red by §1415 (e) ( 3) if 
-::::.. 
parents u~ change their chi'ld 's "current" placement 




A. Availability of Damages under §1415 (e) (2) 
Petrs argue that §1415(e) (2) of the ERA does not authorize 
the award of damages in cases such as this. First, they contend 
that Congress could not have intended to permit damage awards 
under this section because it gives concurrent jurisdiction to 
the federal DCs. Since damage suits against the State would be 
barred by the 11th Amendment, petrs contend that Congress could 
not have intended to authorize this unconstitutional exercise of 
jurisdiction. This argument is not persuasive. In many, if not 
- · ·"'--- ~-- -· 'V 
most, ERA cases, the school district or ~nicipal government, not 
the State, will be the defendant and thus there will be no 11th 
Amendment problem at all. Suits against the State for damages 
----~ 
may be brought in State court. 
Second, petrs claim that a private damages remedy is 
superfluous because other provisions of the ERA are sufficient to 
ensure enforcement of the Act. They note that financial 
sanctions may be imposed if school districts fail to provide the 
appropriate education guaranteed by the Act. These sanctions, 
however, are not found in the section of the Act authorizing 
civil actions by private parties and they do not provide relief 
to private parties for wrongs done to them. The question whether 
damages are "appropriate relief" within the meaning of 
§1415(e) (2) thus is not answered by the fact that other parts of 
the Act provide other enforcement mechanisms. 
Finally, petrs argue that school districts may find it 




individual cases than to provide the appropriate education 
required by the ERA. Thus, they assert, the availability of 
damages would undermine the central purpose of the Act. This is ---nothing but speculation on petrs' part. 
....._...~-- ~
Additionally, as they 
themselves note, there are other means of enforcing the Act, 
including injunctions and financial sanctions. These could be 
used if a school district chose to operate in the bad faith 
manner suggested by petrs. I don't think the possibility of such 
bad faith provides a reason for interpreting §1415(e) (2) to 
preclude damages. 
Petrs have not focused on the strongest argument for 
.. ~--t 
reversing CAl, made by CA7 in Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d 1205 
~
(CA7 1981). CA7 reasoned that in context, it seems unlikely that 
"appropriate relief" under §1415(e) (2) includes damages. Section ,, \ \ 
1415 is entitled "Procedural Safeguards." 
~
It details the 
procedural safeguards required to ensure that free appropriate 
public education is provided, including parental access to all 
relevant records, written notice to parents whenever a change in 
a child's placement is proposed or refused by an educational 
agency, the opportunity for parents to present complaints with 
respect to the placement of their child, and the right to an 
impartial due process hearing on such Subsection 
e(2), the provision at issue here, allows parties aggrieved by 
the outcome of proceedings under this section to bring a civil 
suit. In this context, CA7 thought that "appropriate relief" was 
district judge wide latitude to fashion an individualized 
' . , . ._. 
4. 
educational program for the child. ·" 658 F.2d, at 1211. 
Subsection (e) (2), in CA7's view, represents the last step in the 
procedural chain by which Congress hoped to ensure an appropriate 
education for every child. Most lower courts that have dealt --with this question have followed CA7's logic. 
Although CA7's view is plausible, I am not persuaded 
that the statutory context precludes damages from the rubric of 
"appropriate relief." The whole point of the procedural 
safeguards is to arrive at an appropriate program for the 
handicapped child. 
-~
If a private school placement, undertaken at -parental expense, is later determined to be the appropriate 
~
placement thaf: the school system should have provided in the 
first place, then the statute's goal is seemingly best served by 
allowing the DC to reimburse the parents for tuition. If such 
reimbursement is not available, then the children of parents who 
simply could not afford to pay private school tuition with no 
expectation of reimbursement would be forced to endure 
placements pending review. Thus, CA7's 
interpretation seems to undermine the goal of the statute as a 
whole. 
Resps cite two references in the legislative history that 
~~--~------------
they believe demonstrate Congress' intent to make damages 
available. The Senate Conference 
§1415 (e) (2), stated 
appropriate relief" (emphasis added). 
Report, referring to 
to "grant all 
More significantly, resps --------cite this discussion of tuition reimbursement in the Senate 
Report, referring to a predecessor of §1415 (e) ( 2) : 
.· 
If a parent contends that he or she has been forced, at 
that parent 1 s own expense, to seek private schooling 
for the child because an appropriate program does not 
exist within the local education agency responsible for 
the child 1 s education and the local education agency 
disagrees, that disagreement and the question of who 
remains financially responsible is a matter to which 
the due process procedures established under section 
614(5) apply. 
5. 
Additionally, federal regulations explicitly provide that the due 
process procedures of the Act apply in such disputes. 34 C.F.R. 
§300.403. 
According to resps, "it defies logic to contend that 
Congress intended to require! that the administrative and 
judicial proceedings be used to determine financial 
responsibility for private school placement, but at the same 
time, to prohibit the district court from awarding relief in 
accordance with a determination of financial responsibility." 
This overstates the case. Congress could have intended that the 
due process procedures apply to such disputes, but that the DC 1 s 
resolution have prospective effect only. Still, a fair reading 
___., 
of the language of the Senate Report -- "the question of who 
remains f inailc"ially responsible" -- suggests that the Committee 
I 
thought pa ... rents could be 
ultimat~ly was determined 
appropr1ate. 
reimbursed for private tuition if it 
that placement in a private school was 
The question is a close e. If a district does not live 
up to its statutory obligation to provide an appropriate 
education, and parents are forced to provide one at their own 
expense, it certainly seems "appropriate" for the DC to order 
,., .. 
·. 
that the parents be reimbursed. lndee~, such reimbursement may 
well be necessary to make meaningful parents' right to contest a 
school district's proposed educational plan for their child. 
Thus, I am inclined to recommend affirming CAl on this question. 
B. Impact of §1415 (e) (3) 
Subsection e(3) provides: 
During the pendency of any proceedings 
pursuant to this section, unless the State 
educational agency and t l1'eParents or 
oth.e,.t:~ise agree, the Ch ild shall remain in 
curre t ducational la~ o r such ch i ld . 






appropriate relief in some circumstances under, §1415(e) (3) the 
parents' unilateral decision to change their child's placement in 
violation of e (3) bars the award of tuition reimbursement as 
----------------- .... > 
damages in this case. The statute does not state that this or 
any other penalty is required, although it seems reasonable to 
assume that there must be some consequence for failure to abide 
by the statute's mandate. CAl is probably right that this section 
was meant to prevent school districts from unilaterally changing 
a child's placement before due process proceedings are completed; 
the language, however, is much broader and thus probably should 
govern parental behavior as well. 
~"' J On the facts of this case, however, I don't think it is 1-~~ necessary to reach the question whether (e) (3) bars tuition 
~ reimbursement when parents unilaterally change a child's 
placement. It is clear that both the school district and the 
parents agreed here that the child's placement at Memorial School 
.· 
./ 
was no longer ap~roprj ate. Neither th~ language of the section, .. 
nor logic, supports petrs' claim that their proposed alternative 
became the "then current placement." Since both parties 
"otherwise agreed" that the student should not remain in his 
current placement, and the statute is silent on what happens in 
these circumstances, I think the matter should be treated as if 
the child had no current placement and the parties were deciding 
for the first time what 
I 
to do. In these circumstances, the 
J1 
parents' choice to place him in a private school pending the 
\ 
outcome of review proceedings was a reasonable one, as evidenced _ .... _ ~ - -----. 
by the ALJ's determination that this private school was the 
appropriate placement for the child. Thus, if the Court decides 
that damages are available under 
bars recovery of tuition payments 
c 'ase. 
(e)(2), I don't think (e)(3) 
I /' 
in the circumstances of t his 
Conclusion 
In sum, I would affirm CAl on the availability of tuition 
reimbursement under §1415(e) (2). I would not reach the question 
whether §1415(e) (3) bars such reimbursement where parents 
unilaterally change a child's placement, on the ground that both 
parties agreed that the current placement was inappropriate. 
:r. 
March 19, 1985 
BURLING GINA-POW 
84-433 School Committee of Burlington v. Massachusetts 
Department of Educatioin (CAl) 
(To be argued Tuesday, March 26) 
MEMO TO FILE 
On the basis of a preliminary review of the principle 
briefs and Annmarie's bench memo, I think the case is 
close but I am inclined tentatively to think that Annmarie 
is right: that CAl should be affirmed on the principal 
question with respect to tuition reimbursement under 
...._ --=-~> 
§1415(e) (2) of the Education for all Handicapped Children 
Act. I also would like to avoid addressing the second 
question presented by the parties, and think we need not 
reach it. 
The Principle Question 
Does §1415 (e) (2) of the Act authorize the award of 
It '"'~ 
damages to reimburse parents for tuition if it is 
determined that the appropriate placement for their 
handicapped child is in a private school? 
Although the Act is not specific in authorizing a 
damages award, the general purpose of the Act and its 
legislative history suggest that parents should have a 
? . 
right to recover - by a suit in federal district court -
reimbursement of tuition expenses required to send their 
handicapped child to a private school when the town's 
public school did not provide appropriate training. 
There is nothing to petitioner's Eleventh Amendment 
argument, as these cases are brought against the school 
district or a municipal government, and not the state 
itself. Moreover, suits against the state for such 
reimbursement may be brought in state court. 
The stronger argument for petitioner, the School of 
Burlington, is that relied in Anderson v. Thompson, a CA7 
decision of 1981. That court reasoned that §1415(e) (2) 
provided basically for "procedural safeguards", including 
the right to an impartial due process hearing on 
complaints of parents. This is not a frivolous argument, 
and does make the question close. 
Second Question 
Is the award of such damages barred by §1415(e) (3) if 
parents unilaterally change their child's school placement 
without the prior consent of school officials? 
I think it unnecessary to reach this question on the 
facts of the case. Section 1415(e) (3) does not appear to 






change. But in this case both the school district and the 
/1 
parents had agreed that the child's placement at Memorial 
School was no longer appropriate. Thus there had been an 
agreement in effect that there should be some alternative 
to the "then current placement". 
Summary: 
Affirm CAl on the availability of tuition 
reimbursement under §1415(e) (2). Unnecessary to reach the 
question whether §1415(e) (3) bars reimbursement on the 
facts of this case - where the parties had agreed that the 
current placement of the child was inappropriate. 
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To: Justice Powell 
From: Annmar ie 
Re: No. 84-433, School Committee of Burlington 
School Committee of Burlington: The argument in this 
case has not changed my view that the Court should affirm ----... 
CAl in this case. In fact, I'm more convinced now. Petr -
didn't make any clear argument at all that, as a general 
matter, tuition reimbursement is not appropriate relief 
under §1415(e) (2). Instead, petr focused on the reasonable-
ness of awarding reimbursement in this case, and specifical-
lyon whether the parents' made a unilateral decision to 
change the child's placement in violation of (e) (3). I 
think this question is best resolved by viewing the child's 
"current placement" as his placement in Memorial School. 
Since the town and parents agreed that the child's current 
placement was inappropriate, the parents were under no obli-
gation to let him remain there. As a result, if the school 
district did not provide an appropriate placement for the 
child, as the State hearing officer found, then I think tu-
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didn't make any clear argument at all that, as a general 
matter, tuition reimbursement is not appropriate relief 
under §1415 (e) (2). Instead, petr focused on the reasonable-
ness of awarding reimbursement in this case, and specifical-
lyon whether the parents' made a unilateral decision to 
change the child's placement in violation of (e) (3). I 
think this question is best resolved by viewing the child's 
"current placement" as his placement in Memorial School. 
Since the town and parents agreed that the child's current 
placement was inappropriate, the parents were under no obli-
gation to let him remain there. As a result, if the school 
district did not provide an appropriate placement for the 
child, as the State hearing officer found, then I think tu-





To: Justice Powell 
From: Annmarie 
Re: School Committee of Burlington, No. 84-433 
Sequence of Events 
Sept. 1975 - June 1979: Child attended Memorial 
School, a public school 
March 1978: first IEP proposed and accepted by par-
ents. Under its terms, child is to stay in Memorial School, 
but spend part of each day in reading clinic. IEP to remain 
in effect for one year. 
May - June 1979: parents and school officials cqp-
on new IEP for the 1979-1980 school year. All oar-
-~ ~ 
I I "' ties agreed that child should not remain at Memorial School. 
They ~isagreed on what would be an appropriate placement, at ---least in part because they disagreed on the source of the 
child's l~arning disability. 
Early summer 1979: school officials proposed IEP for 
coming school year. The plan called for child's transfer 
from Memorial School to a separate special class at the Pine 
Glen School, another public school in Burlington . 
. J 
2. 
July 3, 1979: parents rejected IEP and commenced ad-
ministrative proceedings. 
July 10, 1979: Dr. Lott, a pediatric neurologist at 
Mass. General Hospital, informed parents that testing re-
vealed their child to have "severe learning disorder charac-
terized by perceptual difficulties." He recommended place-
men~l, which had a specialized program for 
children with such handicaps. 
July - August 1979: parents and school officials un-
successfully attempted to mediate their dispute about appro-
priate placement and parents decided to pursue administra-
tiv~es. 
September 1979: parents enrolled child in Carroll 
School. Hearings were held on Sept. 26, Oct. 30-31, and Nov. 
1, 1979. 
January 1980: State administrative hearing officer 
rendered her decision that the placement proposed by school 
~
officials was not appropriate. She ordered the town to re-
-------------------------
imburse parents for tuition already paid to Carroll School. 
~bruary 1980: Town filed suit in DC. 
Discussion of the Applicability of §1415(e) (3) 
Section 1415 (e) (3) of the statute provides: 
During the pendency of any proceedings con-
ducted pursuant to this section, unless the 
State or local educational agency and the 
parents or guardian otherwise agree, the 
child shall remain in the then current educa-
tional placement of such child • • • . 
This case raises two questions about this section: 
first,Cl2hat was the child's "then current educational 
placement?" and seconc:Pdoes this section apply if the par-
ties have "otherwise agreed" that the current placement is 
not appropriate? 
Current Educational Placement: Petr claims that the 
placement it proposed in the summer of 1979 (Pine Glen 
School) was the "then current educational placement" and 
thus that the statute required that the child "remain" in 
that placement pending the administrative and judicial pro-
ceedings. This proposition seems quite farfetched to me. 
The child was never attended the Pine Glen School, and thus 
it doesn't make sense that statute would require him to "re-
main" there. A far more reasonable interpretation, I think, 
is to view Memorial School as the child's "then current edu-
cational placement." This is the school he last attended, 
~
and would have continued to attend if he had progressed in 
the normal course. 
"Otherwise Agreed": If my argument is correct that 
Memorial School was the child's then current placement, the 




he should not remain there during pendency of the adminis-
trative and judicial proceedings? I would say that they 
~
have so agreed, because both parties agree that Memorial 
School is no longer appropriate. Indeed, at argument, 
petr's attorney conceded that he did not think the child had 
to remain in Memorial School. 
It is possible, however, to argue that the statute 
requires the child to remain in a concededly inappropriate 
placement if there is no agreement on an interim placement 
while proceedings are pending. One reading of the Depart-
ment of Education's "Notice of Interpretation" for 
§1415(e) (3) suggests that the Department takes this posi-
tion. I've attached a copy of the regulation. Since petr 
did not take this position, and the regulation is somewhat 
ambiguous, the Court can hold that in this case the parties 
have agreed that the child need not remain in the Memorial 
School. If the Court so holds, then it need not reach the 
question whether the statute would bar reimbursement if, 
without the school's agreement, the parents had changed 
their child's placement while proceedings were pending. 
Appropriateness of Parents' Choice: You asked me to 
explain how the statute would prevent parents from making an 
extravagant choice for their child, e. g., sending their 
child to St. Paul's, at the Town's expense. I think the 
answer is that the hearing officer, and ultimately the DC, 
have discretion to award "appropriate relief." In most 
cases, parents would be hard pressed to justify reimburse-
4. 
5. 
ment for sending their child to St. Paul's if there a local, 
less costly program that would meet the child's needs. The 
applicable Massachusetts regulation requires the school dis-
trict to pay for private schooling if the hearing officer 
"determines that the IEP developed by the school committee 
is inadequate and the parent's choice of placement is appro-
priate ••• II Thus, the fact that school officials did 
not offer an appropriate placement does not necessarily mean 
that the Town must pay for parents' choice. The hearing 
officer must determine the appropriateness of parents' 
choice as well. Moreover, the statute expresses a clear 
preference for free, public education, and thus reimburse-
ment for any private school is available only when there is 








Chapter 111-0H. of Spec. Educ. and Rehab. Services App.C 
cation program. <See Questions 37-43, 
below, regarding goals and objectives in the 
IEP.> However, since the IEP Is not Intend-
ed to Include the specifics about a child's 
total educational program that are found In 
dally, weekly, or monthly Instructional 
plans, parents will often need to obtain 
more specific, on-going Information about 
the child's progress-through parent-teach· 
er conferences, report cards and other re-
portin& procedures ordinarily used by the 
agency. 
34. Mu&t lEPs include speci,fic "checkpoint 
intervals" for parenls to conJer with teach-
ers and to revise or update their children's 
lEPs? 
No. A handicapped child's IEP Is not re-
Quired to Include specific "checkpoint Inter-
vals" <I.e., meeting dates> for reviewing the 
child's progress. However, In Individual situ-
ations, specific meeting dates could be desig-
nated In the IEP, If the parents and school 
presonnel believe that It would be helpful to 
do so. 
Although meeting dates are not required 
to be set out In the IEP Itself, there are spe-
cific provisions In the regulations and In 
this document regarding agency responsibil-
Ities In Initiating IEP meetings, Including 
the followlnr: : 
(1> Public agencies must hold meetlrigs pe-
riodically, but not less than annually, to 
review, and If appropriate, revise, each 
child's IEP <1300.343(d)); <2> there should 
be as many meetings a year as the child 
needs <see Question 10, above>; and <3> agen-
cies should grant any reasonable parental 
request for an IEP meeting <see Question 
11, above>. 
In addition to the above provisions, it Is 
expected that, through an agency's general 
reporting procedures for all children in 
school, there will be specific designated 
times for parents to review their children's 
progress <e.r.. through periodic parent-
teacher conferences, and/or the use of 
report cards, letters, or other reporting de-
vices>. 
35. II the parents and agency are unable to 
reach agreement at an IEP meeting, what 
steps should be followed until agreement is 
reached? 
As a general rule, the agency and parents 
would agree to an Interim course of action 
for serving the child <I.e., in terms of place-
ment and/or services> to be followed until 
the area of disagreement over the IEP is re-
solved. The manner In which this interim 
measure Is developed and agreed to by both 
parties Is left to the discretion of the Indi-
vidual State or local agency. However, If the 
parents and agency cannot agree on an in· 
terlm measure, the child's last agreed upon 
IEP would remain in effect in the areas of 
disagreement until the disagreement is re· 
solved. The following may be helpful to 
agencies when there are disagreements: 
a. There may be instances where the par-
ents and agency are in agreement about the 
basic IEP services <e.g., the child's place-
ment and/or the special education services>. 
but disagree about the provision of a par· 
ticular related service <I.e., whether the 
service is needed and/or the amount to be 
provided>. In such cases, it is recommended 
(1) that the IEP be implemented in all areas 
in which there is agreement, <2> that the 
document indicate the points of disagree-
ment, and <3> that procedures be initiated to 
resolve the disagreement. 
b. Sometimes the disagreement is with the 
placement or kind of special education to be 
provided <e.g., one party proposes a self-con-
tained placement, and the other proposes 
resource room services). In such cases, the 
agency might, for example, carry out any 
one or all of the following steps: 
< 1 > Remind the parents that they may re-
solve their differences through the due 
process procedures under EHA-B; <2> work 
with the parents to develop an interim 
course of action (in terms of placement 
and/or services> which both parties can 
agree to until resolution Is reached; and (3) 
recommend the use of mediation, or some 
other informal procedure for resolving the 
differences without going to a due process 
hearing. <See Question 32, above, regarding 
the right to appeal.> 
c. If, because of the disagreement over the 
IEP, a hearing is initiated by either the par-
ents or agency, the agency may not change 
the child's placement unless the parents 
and agency agree otherwise. <See I 300.513, 
Child's status during proceedings.> The fol-
lowing two examples are related to this re-
quirement: 
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<1 > A child In the regular fourth grade has 
been evaluated and found tp be eligible for 
special education. The agency and parents 
agree that the child has a specific leamlnr 
disability. However, one party proposes 
placement in a self-contained program, and 
the other proposes placement in a resource 
room. Agreement cannot be reached, and a 
due process hearing Is initiated. Unless the 
parents and agency agree otherwise, the 
child would remain in the regular fourth 
grade until the issue Is resolved. 
On the other hand, since the child's need 
for special education Is not In question, both 
parties might agree-as an Interim meas-
ure-<1 > to temporarily place the child in 
either one of the programs proposed at the 
meeting <self-contained program or resource 
room>. or <2> to serve the child through 
some other temporary arrangement. 
<2> A handicapped child is currently re-
ceiving special education under an existing 
IEP. A due process hearing has been inltiat· 
ed regarding an alternative special educa· 
tion placement for the child. Unless the par-
ents and agency agree otherwise, the child 
App. C 
would remain in the current placement. In 
this situation, the child's IEP could be re-
vised, as necessary, and implemented In all 
of the areas agreed to by the parents and 
agency, while the area of disagreement <I.e., 
the child's placement> is being settled 
through due process. 
NoTE: If the due process hearing concerns 
§ 300.346 Content of individualized educa-
tion program. 
The individuallzed education program 
for each chlld must Include: 
<a> A statement of the child's present 
levels of educational performance; 
<b> A statement of annual goals, In-
cluding short term Instructional objec-
tives; 
<c> A statement of the specific special 
education and related services to be pr<>-
vided to the chlld, and the extent to 
which the chlld will be able to partici-
pate In regular educational programs; 
36. What should be included in the state-
ment of the child's present levels of educa-
tional performance? 
The statement of present levels of educa-
tional performance will be different for 
each handicapped child. Thus, determina-
tions about the content of the statement for 
an Individual child are matters that are left 
to the discretion of participants In the IEP 
meetings. However, the following are some 
points which should be taken Into account 
in writing thl6 part of the IEP. 
a. The statement should accurately de-
scribe the effect of the child's handicap on 
the child's performance In any area of edu-
cation that Is affected, including <1> aca-
demic areas <reading, math, communication, 
etc.), and <2> non-academic areas <daily life 
activities, mobility, etc.). 
NoTE: Labels such as "mentally retarded" 
or "deaf" may not be used as a substitute 
for the description of present levels of edu-
cational performance.> 
b. The statement should be written in ob-
jective measurable terms, to the extent pos-
sible. Data from the child's evaluation 
would be a good source of such information. 
Test scores that are pertinent to the child's 
diagnosis might be included, where appro-
priate. However, the scores should be < ll 
self-explanatory <i.e., they can be interpret-
ed by all participants without the use of test 
manuals or other aids>. or <2> an explana-
tion should be included. Whatever test re-
sults are used should reflect the impact of 
Title 34-Education 
whether or not a particular service should 
continue to be provided under the IEP <e.g., 
physical therapy), that service would con-
tinue to be provided to the child under the 
IEP that was in effect at the time the hear-
ing was initiated, <1> unless the parents and 
agency agree to a change in the services, or 
<2> until the issue is resolved. 
<d> The projected dates for Initiation 
of services and the anticipated duration 
of the services; and 
<e> Appropriate objective crl:terla and 
evaluation procedures and schedules for 
determining, on at least an annual basis, 
whether the short tenn instructional ob-
jectives are being achieved. 
(20 U.S.C . 1401 (19); 1412 (2) (B), (4), (II), 
1414(a)(6); Senate Report No . 94- 168, p . 11 
(1975) . ) 
the handicap on the child's performance. 
Thus, raw scores would not usually be suffi-
cient. • 
c. There should be a direct relationship 
between the present levels of educational 
performance and the other components of 
the IEP. Thus, If the statement describes a 
problem with the child's reading level and 
points to a deficiency In a specific reading 
skill, this problem should be addressed 
under both (1) goals and objectives, and <2> 
specific special education and related serv-
ices to be provided to the child. 
37. Why are goals and objectives require in 
the IEP? 
The statutory requirements for Including 
annual goals and short term' objectives <Sec-
tion 602< 19)(B)), and for having at least an 
annual review of a handicapped child's IEP 
<Section 614<a)(5)), provide a mechanism for 
determining < 1 > whether the anticipated 
outcomes for the child are being met (I.e .. 
whether the child is progressing In the spe-
cial education program> and <2> whether the 
placement and services are appropriate to 
the child's special learning needs. In effect, 
these requirements provide a way for the 
child 's teacher<s> and parents to be able to 
track the child's progress in special educa-
tion. However, the goals and objectives in 
the IEP are not intended to be as specific as 
the goals and objectives that are normally 
found In daily, weekly, or monthly instruc-
tional plans. 
38. What are "annual goals " in an IEP? 
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§ 300.385 
and practices targeted on identified 
local needs; and 
<3> Use of instructional materials 
and other media for personnel devel-
opment and instructional program-
ming. 
<20 U .S .C. 1413<aH3» 
§ 300.385 Adoption of educational prac-
tices. 
<a> Each annual program plan must 
provide for a statewide system de-
signed to adopt, where appropriate, 
promising educational practices and 
materials proven effective through re-
search and demonstration. 
<b> Each annual program plan must 
provide for thorough reassessment of 
educational practices used in the 
State. 
<c> Each annual program plan must 
provide for the identification of State, 
local, and regional resources <human 
and material> which will assist in 
meeting the State's personnel prepara-
tion needs. 
(20 u.s.c. 1413(&)(3)) 
§ 300.386 [Reserved] 
§ 300.387 Technical assistance to local 
educational agencies. 
Each annual program plan must in-
clude a description of technical assist-
ance that the State educational 
agency gives to local educational agen-
cies in their implementation of the 
State's comprehensive system of per-
sonnel development. 
(20 u.s.c. 1413(&)(3)) 
Subpart D-Private Schools 
HANDICAPPED CHILDREN IN PRIVATE 
SCHOOLS PLACED OR REFERRED BY 
PuBLIC AGENCIES 
§ 300.400 Applicability of §§ 300.401-
300.403. 
Sections 300.401-300.403 apply only 
to handicapped children who are or 
have been placed in or referred to a 
private school or facility by a public 
agency as a means of providing special 
education and related services. 
<20 U .S .C. 1413<a><4><B» 
Title 34-Education 
§ 300.401 Responsibility of State educa-
tional agency. 
Each State educational agency shall 
insure that a handicapped child who is 
placed in or referred to a private 
school or facility by a public agency: 
<a> Is provided special education and 
related services: 
< 1 > In conformance with an individ-
ualized education program which 
meets the requirements under 
§ § 300.340-300.349 of Subpart C; 
<2> At no cost to the parents; and 
<3> At a school or facility which 
meets the standards that apply to 
State and local educational agencies 
<including the requirements in this 
part>; and 
<b> Has all of the rights of a handi-
capped child who is served by a public 
agency. 
<20 U .S .C . 1413<a><4><B» 
§ 300.402 Implementation by State educa-
tional agency. 
In implementing § 300.401, the State 
educational agency shall: 
<a> Monitor compliance through pro-
cedures such as written reports, on-
site visits, and parent questionnaires: 
<b> Disseminate copies of applicable 
standards to each private school and 
facility to which a public agency has 
referred or placed a handicapped 
child; and 
<c> Provide an opportunity for those 
private schools and facilities to partici-
pate in the development .and revision 
of State standards which apply to 
them. 
<20 U.S.C . 1413<a><4HB» 
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§ 300.403 Placement of children by par-
ents. 
<a> If a handicapped child has avail-
able a free appropriate public educa-
tion and the parents choose to place 
the child in a private school or facility, 
the public agency is not required by 
this part to pay for the child's educa-
tion at the private school or facility . 
However, the public agency shall make 
services available to the child as pro-
vided under § § 300.450-300.460. 
<b> Disagreements between a parent 
and a public agency regarding the 
availability of a program appropriate 
Chapter 111-0ff. of Spec. Educ. and Rehab. Services § 300.501 
for the child, and the question of fi-
nancial responsibility, are subject to 
the due process procedures under 
§§ 300.500- 300.514 of Subpart E. 
(20 U.S .C. 1412<2HBl; 1415> 
HANDICAPPED CHILDREN IN PRIVATE 
SCHOOLS NOT PLACED OR REFERRED BY 
PUBLIC AGENCIES 
§ 300.450 Definition of "private school 
handicapped children." 
As used in §§ 300.451- 300.452, "pri-
vate school handicapped children" 
means handicapped children enrolled 
in private schools or facilities other 
than handicapped children covered 
under § § 300.400- 300.403. 
<20 U.S .C. 1413<aH4HAll 
[45 FR 22531. Apr. 3. 1980. Redesignated at 
45 FR 77368, Nov. 21, 1980] 
§ 300.451 State educational agency respon-
sibility. 
The State educational agency shall 
insure that- : 
<a> To the extent consistent with 
their number and location in the 
State, provision is made for the par-
ticipaUon of private school handi-
capped children in the program assist-
ed or carried out under this part by 
providing them with special education 
and related services; and 
(b) The requirements in 34 CFR 
76.651-76.663 of EDGAR are met. 
<20 U.S .C. 1413<aH4HAll 
[45 FR 22531, Apr. 3, 1980. Redesignated at 
45 FR 77368, Nov. 21, 1980] 
§ 300.452 Local educational agency re-
sponsibility. 
<a> Each local educational agency 
shall provide special education and re-
lated services designed to meet the 
needs of private school handicapped 
children residing in the jurisdiction of 
the agency. 
<Sec. 1413<aH4HAl; 1414<aH6ll 
[42 FR 42476, Aug. 23 , 1977, as amended at 
45 FR 22531, Apr. 3. 1980. Redesignated at 
45 FR 77368, Nov. 21 , 1980] 
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Subpart E-Procedural Safeguards 
DUE PROCESS PROCEDURES FOR PARENTS 
AND CHILDREN 
§ 300.500 Definitions of "consent", "eval-
uation", and "personally identifiable". 
As used in this part: "Consent" 
means that: 
(a) The parent has been fully in-
formed of all information relevant to 
the activity for which consent is 
sought, in his or her native language, 
or other mode of communication; 
<bl The parent understands and 
agrees in writing to the carrying out of 
the activity for which his or her con-
sent is sought, and the consent de-
scribes that activity and lists the rec-
ords Of any> which will be released 
and to whom; and 
(c) The parent understands that the 
granting of consent is voluntary on 
the part of the parent and may be re-
voked at any time., 
"Evaluation" means procedures used 
in accordance with § § 300.530- 300.534 
to determine whether a child is handi-
capped and the nature and extent of 
the special education and related serv-
ices that the child needs. The term 
means procedures used selectively 
with an individual child and does not 
include basic tests administered to or 
procedures used with all children in a 
school, grade, or class. 
"Personally identifiable" means that 
information includes: 
<a> The name of the child, the 
child's parent, or other family 
member; 
<bl The address of the child; 
(c) A personal identifier, such as the 
child's social security number or stu-
dent number; or 
<dl A list of personal characteristics 
or other information which would 
make it possible to identify the child 
with reasonable certainty. 
<20 U.S.C. 1415, 1417<c» 
§ 300.501 General responsibility of public 
agencies. 
Each State educational agency shall 
insure that each public agency estab-
lishes and Implements procedural safe-
guards which meet the requirements 
of § § 300.500-300.514. 
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From: Justice Rehnquist 
Circulated: APR 1 7 1985 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-433 
BURLINGTON SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF THE TOWN 
OF BURLINGTON, MASSACHUSETTS, ET AL., 
PETITIONERS v. DEPARTMENT OF EDU-
CATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH 
OF MASSACHUSETTS ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT 
[April -, 1985] 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The Education of the Handicapped Act (Act), 84 Stat. 175, 
as amended, 20 U. S. C. § 1401 et seq., requires participating 
state and local educational agencies "to assure that handi-
capped children and their parents or guardians are guaran-
teed procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of 
free appropriate public education" to such handicapped chil-
dren. § 1415(a). These procedures include the right of the 
parents to participate in the development of an "individual-
ized education program" (IEP) for the child and to challenge 
in administrative and court proceedings a proposed IEP with 
which they disagree. §§ 1401(19), 1415(b),(d),(e). Where as 
in the present case review of a contested IEP takes years to 
run its course-years critical to the child's development-
important practical questions arise concerning interim place-
ment of the child and financial responsiblity for that place-
ment. This case requires us to address some of those 
,. ,..tf- questions. 
1' \ Michael Panico, the son of respondent Robert Panico, was 
~ /,r \; a first grader in the public school system of petitioner Town 
of Burlington, Massachusetts, when he began experiencing 
serious difficulties in school. It later became evident that 
~ . f/v_~~a~~~fct-7 
(}~ wl+M k ~ ~~ r~' 
[) ~ +ue_ ~ l uN_ 6f5 ~ f?<L 1 '/lr{-c~gtthh~ 
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he had "specific learning disabilities" and thus was "handi-
capped" within the meaning of the Act, 20 U. S. C.§ 1401(1). 
This entitled him to receive at public expense specially 
designed instruction to meet his unique needs, as well as 
related transportation. §§ 1401(16), 1401(17). The negotia-
tions and other proceedings between the Town and the Pan-
icos, thus far spanning more than 8 years, are too involved to 
relate in full detail; the following are the parts relevant to the 
issues on which we granted certiorari. 
In the spring of 1979, Michael attended the third grade of 
the Memorial School, a public school in Burlington, Mass., 
under an IEP calling for individual tutoring by a reading spe-
cialist for one hour a day and individual and group counsel-
ling. Michael's continued poor performance and the fact that 
Memorial School encompassed only grades K through 3 led to 
much discussion between his parents and Town school offi-
cials about his difficulties and his future schooling. Appar-
ently the course of these discussions did not run smoothly; 
the upshot was that the Panicos and the Town agreed that 
Michael was generally of above average to superior intelli-
gence, but had special educational needs calling for a place-
ment in a school other than Memorial. They disagreed over 
the source and exact nature of Michael's learning difficulties, 
the Town believing the source to be emotional and the par-
ents believing it to be neurological. 
In late June, the Town presented the Panicos with a pro-
posed IEP for Michael for the 1979-1980 academic year. It 
called for placing Michael in a highly structured class of six 
children with special academic and social needs, located at 
another Town public school, the Pine Glen School. On July 
3, Michael's father rejected the proposed IEP and sought re-
view'illider§ 1415(b)(2) by respondent Mass. Department of 
Education's Bureau of Special Education Appeals (BSEA). 
A hearing was initially scheduled for August 8, but was ap-
parently postponed in favor of a mediation session on August 
17. The mediation efforts proved unsuccessful. 
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Meanwhile the Panicos received the results of the latest 
expert evaluation of Michael by specialists at Mass. General 
Hospital, who opined that Michael's "emotional difficulties 
are secondary to a rather severe learning disorder character-
ized by perceptual difficulties" and recommended "a highly 
specialized setting for children with learning handicaps ... 
such as the Carroll School," a State approved private school 
for special education located in Lincoln, Mass. Joint App. 
pp. 26, 31. Believing that the Town's proposed placement of 
Michael at the Pine Glen school was inappropriate in light of 
Michael's needs, Mr. Panico enrolled Michael in the Carroll 
School in mid-August at his own ---exi)ense, and Michael 
started there in September. 
The BSEA held several hearings during the fall of 1979, 
and in January 1980 the hearing officer decided that the 
Town's proposed placement at t e me len c ool was inap-
proprla e an tha the arro School was "the east restric-
tive a equate program within the record" for Michael's edu-
cational needs. The hearing officer ordered the Town to pay 
for Michael's tuition and transportation to the Carroll School 
for the 1979-1980 school year, including reimbursing the 
Panicos for their expenditures on these items for the school 
year to date. 
The Town sought judicial review of the State's adminis-
trative decision in the United States District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts pursuant to 20 U. S. C. § 1415(e)(2) 
and a parallel State statute, naming Mr. Panico and the State 
Department of Education as defendants. In November 
1980, the District Court granted summary judgment against 
the Town on the state-law claim under a "substantial evi-
dence" standard of review, entering a final judgment on this 
claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). The 
Court also set the federal claim for future trial. The Court 
of Appeals vacated the judgment on the state-law claim, 
holding that review under the State statute was preempted 
by § 1415(e)(2), which establishes a "preponderance of the 
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evidence" standard of review and which permits the review-
ing court to hear additional evidence. 
In the meantime, the Town had refused to comply with the 
BSEA order, the District Court had denied a stay of that 
order, and the Panicos and the State had moved for prelimi-
nary injunctive relief. The State also had threatened out-
side of the judicial proceedings to freeze all of the Town's spe-
cial education assistance unless it complied with the BSEA 
order. Apparently in response to this threat, · the Town 
agreed in February 1981 to pay for Michael's Carroll School 
placement and related transportation for the 1980-1981 term, 
none of which had yet been paid, and to continue paying for 
these expenses until the case was decided. But the Town 
persisted in refusing to reimburse Mr. Panico for the ex-
penses of the 1979-1980 school year. When the Court of 
Appeals disposed of the State claim, it also held that under 
this status quo none of the parties could show irreparable in-
jury and thus none was entitled to a preliminary injunction. 
The Court reasoned that the Town had not shown that Mr. 
Panico would not be able to repay the tuition and related 
costs borne by the Town if he ultimately lost on the merits, 
and Mr. Panico had not shown that he would be irreparably 
harmed if not reimbursed immediately for past payments 
which might ultimately be determined to be the Town's 
responsibility. 
On remand, the District Court entered an extensive pre- j}. G 
trial order on the Town's federal claim. In denying the 
Town summary judgment, it ruled that 20 U. S. C. 
§ 1415(e)(3) did not bar reimbursement despite the Town's 
insistence that the Panicos violated that provision by chang-
ing Michael's placement to the Carroll School during the 
pendency of the administrative proceedings. The court rea-
soned that § 1415(e)(3) concerned the physical placement of 
the child and not the right to tuition reimbursement or to pro-
cedural review of a contested IEP. The court also dealt with 
the problem that no IEP had been developed for the 
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1980-1981 or 1981-1982 school years. It held that its power 
under § 1415(e)(2) to grant "appropriate" relief upon review-
ing the contested IEP for the 1979-1980 school year included 
the power to grant relief for subsequent school years despite 
the lack of IEPs for those years. In this connection, how-
ever, the court interpreted the statute to place the burden of 
proof on the Town to upset the BSEA decision that the IEP 
was inappropriate for 1979-1980 and on the Panicos and the 
State to show that the relief for subsequent terms was 
appropriate. 
After a four-day trial, the District Court in May 1982 over- A / 
turned the BSE-Aetecision, holding that the appropriate ~' ~ 
1979-1980 placement for Michael was the one proposed by 
the Town in the IEP and that the parents had failed to show 
that this placement would not also have been appropriate for 
subsequent years. Accordingly, the Court concluded that 
the Town was "not responsible for the cost of Michael's edu-
cation at the Carroll School for the academic years 1979-80 
through 1981-82." 
In contesting the Town's proposed form of judgment em-
bodying the court's conclusion, Mr. Panico argued that, 
despite finally losing on the merits of the IEP in August 1982, 
he should be reimbursed for his expenditures in 1979-1980, 
that the Town should finish paying for the recently completed 
1981-1982 term, and that he should not be required to reim-
burse the Town for its payments to date, apparently because 
the school terms in question fell within the pendency of the 
administrative and judicial review contemplated by § 1415 
(e)(2). The case was transferred to another District Judge 
and consolidated with two other cases to resolve similar is-
sues concerning the reimbursement for expenditures during 
the pendency of review proceedings. 
In a decision on the consolidated cases, the Court rejected 
Mr. Panico's argument that the Carroll School was the "cur-
rent educational placement" during the pendency of the re-
view proceedings and thus that under § 1415(e)(3) the Town 
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was obligated to maintain that placement. The Court rea-
soned that the Panicos' unilateral action in placing Michael at 
the Carroll School without the Town's consent could not "con-
fer thereon the imprimatur of continued placement," even 
though strictly speaking there was no actual placement in 
effect during the summer of 1979 because all parties agreed 
Michael was finished with the Memorial School and the Town 
itself proposed in the IEP to transfer him to a new school in 
the fall. 
The District Court next rejected an argument, apparently 
grounded at least in part on a State regulation, that the 
Panicos were entitled to rely on the BSEA decision upholding 
their placement contrary to the IEP, regardless of whether 
that decision were ultimately reversed by a court. With 
respect to the payments made by the Town after the BSEA 
decision, under the State's threat to cut off funding, the court 
criticized the State for resorting to extrajudicial pressure to 
enforce a decision subject to further review. Because this 
"was not a case where the town was legally obligated under 
section 1415(e)(3) to continue payments preserving the status 
quo," the State's coercion could not be viewed as "the basis 
for a final decision on liability" and it could only be "regarded 
as other than wrongful ... on the assumption that the pay-
ments were to be returned if the order was ultimately 
reversed." The court entered a judgment ordering the 
Panicos to reimburse the Town for its payments for Michael's 
Carroll placement and related transportation in 1980-1981 
and 1981-1982. The Panicos appealed. 
In a broad opinion, most of which we do not review, the 
Court of"Appeals for t e F1r t Circu' re anded the case a 
secon time. The court ruled, among other things, that t e 
Distri'CtCOurt erred in conducting a full trial de novo, that it 
gave insufficient weight to the BSEA findings, and that in 
other respects it did not properly evaluate the IEP. The 
court also considered several questions about the availability 
of reimbursement for interim placement. The Town argued 
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that § 1415(e)(3) bars the Panicos from any reimbursement 
relief, even if on remand they were to prevail on the merits of 
the IEP, because of their unilateral change of Michael's 
placement during the pendency of the § 1415(e)(2) proceed-
ings. The court held that such unilateral parental change of 
placement would not be "a bar to reimbursement of the par-
ents if their actions are held to be appropriate at final judg-
ment." In dictum the court suggested, however, that a lack 
of parental consultation with the Town or "attempt to achieve 
a negotiated compromise and agreement on a private place-
ment," as contemplated by the Act, "may be taken into 
account in a district court's computation of an award of eq-
uitable reimbursement." To guide the District Court on re-
mand, the court stated that "whether to order reimburse-
ment, and at what amount, is a question determined by 
balancing the equities." The court also held that the 
Panicos' reliance on the BSEA decision would estop the Town 
from obtaining reimbursement "for the period of reliance and 
requires that where parents have paid the bill for the period, 
they must be reimbursed." 
The Town filed a petition for a writ of certoriari in this 
Court---challenging the decision of the Court of Appeals on 
numerous iSsues, mclu mg the scope o JU 1c1a :r:.ev1ew of the 
adiiliniStrative decision and the relevance to th~F merits of an 
IEP of violations by local school authorities of the Act's pro-
cedural requirements. We granted certiorari only to con-
sider the following two issues: whether the potential relief 
available under § 1415(e)(2) includes reimbursement to par-
ents for private school tuition and related expenses, and 
whether § 1415(e)(3) bars such reimbursement to parents 
who reject a proposed IEP and place a child in a private 
school without the consent of local school authorities. We 
express no opinion on any of the many other views stated by 
the Court of Appeals. 
Congress stated the purpose of the Act in these words: 
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"to assure that all handicapped children have available to 
them . . . a free appropriate public education which em-
phasizes special education and related services designed 
to meet their unique needs [and] to assure that the rights 
of handicapped children and their parents or guardians 
are protected." § 1400(c). 
The Act defines a "free appropriate public education" to 
mean: 
"special education and related services which (A) have 
been provided at public expense, under public supervi-
sion and direction, and without charge, (B) meet the 
standards of the State educational agency, (C) include an 
appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school 
education in the State involved, and (D) are provided in 
conformity with [an] individualized education program." 
§ 1401(18). 
To accomplish this ambitious objective, the Act provides fed-
eral money to state and local educational agencies that under-
take to implement the substantive and procedural require-
ments of the Act. See Hendrick Hudson District Bd. of 
Education v. Rowley, 458 U. S. 176, 179-184 (1982). 
The modus operandi of the Act is the already mentioned 
"individualized educational program." The IEP is in brief a 
comprehensive statement of the educational needs of a handi-
capped child and the specially designed instruction and 
related services to be employed to meets those needs. 
§ 1401(19). The IEP is to be developed jointly by a school 
official qualified in special education, the child's teacher, the 
parents or guardian, and, where appropriate, the child. In 
several places, the Act emphasizes the participation of the 
parents in developing the child's educational program and as-
sessing its effectiveness. See §§ 1400(c), 1401(19), 1412(7), 
1415(b)(1)(A), (C), (D), (E), and 1415(b)(2); 34 CFR § 300.345. 
Apparently recognizing that this cooperative approach 
would not always produce a consensus between the schoOl of--
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ficials and the parents, and that in any disputes the school 
officials would have a natural advantage, Congress 
incoporated an elaborate et of what it label <J. ":erocedural 
safeguards" to insure the full participation of the parentsand 
p~solution of substantive disagreements. Section 
1415(b) entitles the parents "to examine all relevant records 
with respect to the identification, evaluation, and educational 
placement of the child," to obtain an independent educational 
evaluation of the child, to notice of any decision to initiate or 
change the identification, evaluation, or educational place-
ment of the child, and to present complaints with respect to 
any of the above. The parents are further entitled to "an im-
partial due process hearing," which in the instant case was 
the BSEA hearing, to resolve their complaints. 
The Act also provides for judicial review in state or federal 
court to "[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision" 
made after the due process hearing. The Act confers on the 
reviewing court the following authority: 
"[T]he court shall receive the records of the adminis-
trative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at the 
request of a party, and, basing its decision on the pre-
ponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the 
court determines is appropriate." § 1415(e)(2). 
The first question on which we granted certiorari requires us 
to dec1 e w e er is gran o au or1ty inc udes the power 
to order school authorities to reimburse parents for their ex-
penditures on private special education for a child if the court 
ultimately determines that such placement, rather than a 
proposed IEP, is proper under the Act. 
We conclude that the Act authorizes such reimbursement. 
The statute directs the court ~t sucli relie!as [it] 
determines is appropriate." The ordinary meaning of these 
words confers broad discretion on the court. The type of 
relief is not further specified, except that it must be "appro-
priate." Absent other reference, the only possible interpre-
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purpose of the Act. As already noted, this is principally to 
provide handicapped children with "a free appropriate public 
education which emphasizes special education and related 
services designed to meet their unique needs." The Act con-
templates that such education will be provided where possi-
ble in regular public schools, with the child participating as 
much as possible in the same activities as non-handicapped 
children, but the Act also provides for placement in private 
schools at public expense where this is not possible. See 
§ 1412(5); 34 CFR §§300.132, 300.227, 300.307(b), 300.347. 
In a case where a court determines that a private placement 
desired by the parents was proper under the Act and that an 
IEP calling for placement in a public school was inappropri-
ate, it seems clear beyond cavil that "appropriate" relief 
would include a prospective injunction directing the school 
offici o e e op and Imp ement at ub1ic expense aii IEP 
placing t c I 1 a private sc oo . 
I e a mimstrative an JUdicial review under the Act 
could be completed in a matter of weeks, rather than years, it 
would be difficult to imagine a case in which such prospective 
injunctive relief would not be sufficient. As this case so viv-
idly demonstrates, however, the review process is ponder-
ous. A final judicial decision on the merits of an IEP will in 
most instances come a year or more after the school term cov-
ered by that IEP has passed. In the meantime, the parents 
who disagree with the proposed IEP are faced with a choice: 
go along with the IEP to the detriment of their child if it 
turns out to be inappropriate or pay for what they consider 
to be the appropriate placement. If they choose the latter 
course, which conscientious parents who have adequate 
means and who are reasonably confident of their assessment 
normally would, it would be an empty victory to have a court 
tell them several years later that they were right but that 
these expenditures could not in a proper case be reimbursed 
by the school officials. If that were the case the child's right 
to a free appropriate public education, the parents' right to 
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participate fully in developing a proper IEP, and all of the 
procedural safeguards would be less than complete. Be-
cause Congress undoubtedly did not intend this result, we 
are confident that by empowering the court to grant "appro-
priate" relief Congress meant to include retroactive re-
imbursement to parents as an available remedy in a proper 
"If a parent contends that he or she has been forced, at 
that parent's own expense, to seek private schooling for 
the child because an appropriate program does not exist 
within the local educational agency responsible for the 
child's education and the local educational agency dis-
agrees, that disagreement and the question of who 
remains financially responsible is a matter to which the 
due process procedures established under [the predeces-
sor to§ 1415] appl[y]." S. Rep. No. 94-168, p. 32 (em-
phasis added). 
See 34 CFR § 300.403(b) (disagreements and question of 
financial responsibility subject to the due process 
procedures). 
Regardless of the availability of reimbursement as a form 
of relief in a proper case, the Town maintains that the 
Panicos have waived any right they otherwise might have to 
reimbursement because they violated § 1415(e)(3), which 
provides: 
"During the pendency of any proceedings conducted pur-
suant to [§ 1415], unless the State or local educational 
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child shall remain in the then current educational place-
ment of such child. . .. " 
We need not resolve the academic question of what Michael's 
"then current placement" was in the summer of 1979, when 
both the Town and the parents had agreed that a new school 
was in order. For the purposes of our decision, we as-
sume that the Pine Glen School, proposed in the IEP, was 
Michael's current placement and, therefore, that the Panicos 
did "change" his placement after they had rejected the IEP 
and had set the administrative review in motion. In so 
doing, the Panicos contravened the conditional command of 
§ 1415(e)(3) that "the child shall remain in the then current 
placement." 
As an initial matter, we note that the section calls for 
agreement by either the State or the local educational 
agency. The BSEA's decision in favor of the Panicos and the 
Carroll School placement would seem to constitute agree-
ment by the State to the change of placement. The decision 
was issued in January 1980, so from then on the Panicos were 
no longer in violation of§ 1415(e)(3). This conclusion, how-
ever, does not entirely resolve the instant dispute because 
the Panicos are also seeking reimbursement for Michael's ex-
penses during the fall of 1979, prior to the State's concur-
rence in the Carroll School placement. 
We do not agree with the Town that a parental violation of \ 
§ 1415(e)(3) constitutes a waiver of reimbursement. The 
provision says nothing about financial responsibility, waiver, 
or parental right to reimbursement at the conclusion of judi-
cial proceedings. Moreover, if the provision is interpreted 
to cut off parental rights to reimbursement, the principal 
purpose of the Act will in many cases be defeated in the same 
way as if reimbursement were never available. As in this 
case, parents will often notice a child's learning difficulties 
while the child is in a regular public school program. If the 
school officials disagree with the need for special education or 
the adequacy of the public school's program to meet the 
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child's needs, it is unlikely they will agree to an interim pri-
vate school placement while the review process runs its 
course. Thus, under the Town's reading of§ 1415(e)(3), the 
parents are forced to leave the child in what may turn out to 
be an inappropriate educational placement or to obtain the 
appropriate placement only by sacrificing any claim for 
reimbursement. The Act was intended to give handicapped 
children both an appropriate education and a free one; it 
should not be interpreted to defeat one or the other of those 
objectives. 
The legislative history supports this interpretation, favor-
ing a proper interim placement pending the resolution of dis-
agreements over the IEP: 
"The conferees are cognizant that an impartial due proc-
ess hearing may be required to assure that the rights of 
the child are completely protected. We did feel, how-
ever, that the placement, or change of placement should 
not be unnecessarily delayed while long and tedious ad-
ministrative appeals were being exhausted. Thus the 
conference adopted a flexible approach to try to meet the 
needs of both the child and the state." 121 Cong. Rec. 
37,412 (1975) (Sen. Stafford). 
We think at least one purpose of§ 1415(e)(3) was to prevent 
school officials from removing a child from the regular public 
school classroom over the parents' objection pending comple-
tion of the review proceedings. As we observed in Rowley, 
458 U. S., at 192, the impetus for the Act came from two fed-
eral court decisions, Pennsylvania Assn. for Retarded Chil-
dren v. Commonwealth, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (ED Pa. 1971), 
and 343 F. Supp. 279 (1972), and Mills v. District of Colum-
bia Board of Education, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D DC 1972), which 
arose from the efforts of parents of handicapped children to 
prevent the exclusion or expulsion of their children from the 
public schools. Congress was concerned about the appar-
ently widespread practice of relegating handicapped children 
to private institutions or warehousing them in special classes. 
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See § 1400(4); 34 CFR §300.347(a). We also note that 
§ 1415(e)(3) is located in a section detailing procedural safe-
guards which are largely for the benefit of the parents and 
the child. 
This is not to say that § 1415(e)(3) has no effect on parents. 
While we doubt that this provision would authorize a court to 
order parents to leave their child in a particular placement, 
we think it operates in sue a way that parents who unilat- I ~ 
erally change e1r c ild's placemen urmg the pen ency of 
review procee mgs, Wit out t e consent of state or local 
school officials, do so at etr own financial risk. If the 
courfSUlfimately etermme that the IEP proposed by the 
school officials was appropriate, the parents would be barred 
from obtaining reimbursement for any interim period in 
which their child's placement violated§ 1415(e)(3). This con-
clusion is supported by the agency's intepretation of the Act's 
application to private placements by the parents: 
"(a) If a handicapped child has available a free appro-
priate public education and the parents choose to place 
the child in a private school or facility, the public agency 
is not required by this part to pay for the child's educa-
tion at the private school or facility .... 
"(b) Disagreements between a parent and a public 
agency regarding the availability of a program appropri-
ate for the child, and the question of financial respon-
sibility, are subject to the due process procedures under 
[§ 1415]." 34 CFR 300.403. 
We thus resolve the questions on which we granted certio-
rari; because the case is here in an interlocutory osture, we 
do not consider the estoppel ruling elow or tlie specific eq-
uitable factors identified by the Court of Appeals for granting 
relief. We do think that the court was correct in concluding 
that "such relief as the court determines is appropriate," 
within the meaning of§ 1415(e)(2), means equitable relief. 
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JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The Education of the Handicapped Act (Act), 84 Stat. 175, 
as amended, 20 U. S. C. § 1401 et seq., requires participating 
state and local educational agencies "to assure that handi-
capped children and their parents or guardians are guaran-
teed procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of 
free appropriate public education" to such handicapped chil-
dren. § 1415(a). These procedures include the ri ht of the 
p~~ntU.Q ... Eg!ic~ the development of an "indiv1 ual-
iie<Iea1lcat1on program" (IEP) for the child and to challenge 
in administrative and court proceedings a proposed IEP with 
which they disagree. §§ 1401(19), 1415(b),(d),(e). Where as 
in the present case review of a contested IEP takes years to 
run its course-years critical to the child's development-
important practical questions arise concerning interim place-
e ch1 d an ancia responsiblity for that place-
ment. This case requires us to address some of those 
questions. 
Michael Panico, the son of respondent Robert Panico, was 
a first grader in the public school system of petitioner Town 
of Burlington, Massachusetts, when he began experiencing 
serious difficulties in school. It later became evident that 
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he had "specific learning disabilities" and thus was "handi-
capped" within the meaning of the Act, 20 U. S. C.§ 1401(1). 
This entitled him to receive at public expense specially 
designed instruction to meet his unique needs, as well as 
related transportation. §§ 1401(16), 1401(17). The negotia-
tions and other proceedings between the Town and the Pan-
icos, thus far spanning more than 8 years, are too involved to 
relate in full detail; the following are the parts relevant to the 
issues on which we granted certiorari. 
In the spring of 1979, Michael attended the third grade of 
the Memorial School, a public school in Burlington, Mass. , 
under an IEP calling for individual tutoring by a reading spe-
cialist for one hour a day and individual and group counsel-
ling. Michael's continued poor performance and the fact that 
Memorial School encompassed only grades K through 3 led to 
much discussion between his parents and Town school offi-
cials about his difficulties and his future schooling. Appar-
ently the course of these discussions did not run smoothly; 
the upshot was that the Panicos and the Town agreed that 
Michael was generally of above average to superior intelli-
gence, but had special educational needs calling for a place-
ment in a school other than Memorial. They disagreed over 
the source and exact nature of Michael's learning difficulties, 
the Town believing the source to be emotional and the par-
ents believing it to be neurological. 
In late June, the Town presented the Panicos with a pro-
posed IEP for Michael for the 1979-1980 academic year. It 
called for placing Michael in a highly structured class of six 
children with special academic and social needs, located at 
another Town public school, the Pine Glen School. On July 
3, Michael's father rejected the proposed IEP and sought re-
view under § 1415(b)(2) by respondent Mass. Department of 
Education's Bureau of Special Education Appeals (BSEA). 
A hearing was initially scheduled for August 8, but was ap-
parently postponed in favor of a mediation session on August 
17. The mediation efforts proved unsuccessful. 
... . 
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Meanwhile the Panicos received the results of the latest 
expert evaluation of Michael by specialists at Mass. General 
Hospital, who opined that Michael's "emotional difficulties 
are secondary to a rather severe learning disorder character-
ized by perceptual difficulties" and recommended "a highly 
specialized setting for children with learning handicaps . . . 
such as the Carroll School," a State approved private school 
for special education located in Lincoln, Mass. Joint App. 
pp. 26, 31. Believing that the Town's proposed placement of 
Michael at the Pine Glen school was inappropriate in light of 
Michael's needs, Mr. Panico enrolled Michael in the Carroll 
School in mid-August at his own expense, and Michael 
started there in September. 
The BSEA held several hearings during the fall of 1979, 
and in January 1980 the hearing officer decided that the 
Town's proposed placement at the Pine Glen School was inap-
propriate and that the Carroll School was "the least restric-
tive adequate program within the record" for Michael's edu-
cational needs. The hearing officer ordered the Town to pay 
for Michael's tuition and transportation to the Carroll School 
for the 1979-1980 school year, including reimbursing the 
Panicos for their expenditures on these items for the school 
year to date. 
The Town sought judicial review of .the State's adminis-
trative decision in the United States District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts pursuant to 20 U. S. C.§ 1415(e)(2) 
and a parallel State statute, naming Mr. Panico and the State 
Department of Education as defendants. In November 
1980, the District Court granted summary judgment against 
the Town on the state-law claim under a "substantial evi-
dence" standard of review, entering a final judgment on this 
claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). The 
Court also set the federal claim for future trial. The Court 
of Appeals vacated the judgment on the state-law claim, 
holding that review under the State statute was preempted 
by § 1415(e)(2), which establishes a "preponderance of the 
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evidence" standard of review and which permits the review-
ing court to hear additional evidence. 
In the meantime, the Town had refused to comply with the 
BSEA order, the District Court had denied a stay of that 
order, and the Panicos and the State had moved for prelimi-
nary injunctive relief. The State also had threatened out-
side of the judicial proceedings to freeze all of the Town's spe-
cial education assistance unless it complied with the BSEA 
order. Apparently in response to this threat, the Town 
agreed in February 1981 to pay for Michael's Carroll School 
placement and related transportation for the 1980-1981 term, 
none of which had yet been paid, and to continue paying for 
these expenses until the case was decided. But the Town 
persisted in refusing to reimburse Mr. Panico for the ex-
penses of the 1979-1980 school year. When the Court of 
Appeals disposed of the State claim, it also held that under 
this status quo none of the parties could show irreparable in-
jury and thus none was entitled to a preliminary injunction. 
The Court reasoned that the Town had not shown that Mr. 
Panico would not be able to repay the tuition and related 
costs borne by the Town if he ultimately lost on the merits, 
and Mr. Panico had not shown that he would be irreparably 
harmed if not reimbursed immediately for past payments 
which might ultimately be determined to be the Town's 
responsibility. 
On remand, the District Court entered an extensive pre-
trial order on the Town's federal claim. In denying the 
Town summary judgment, it ruled that 20 U. S. C. 
§ 1415(e)(3) did not bar reimbursement despite the Town's 
insistence that the Panicos violated that provision by chang-
ing Michael's placement to the Carroll School during the 
pendency of the administrative proceedings. The court rea-
soned that § 1415(e)(3) concerned the physical placement of 
the child and not the right to tuition reimbursement or to pro-
cedural review of a contested IEP. The court also dealt with 
the problem that no IEP had been developed for the 
. • 
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1980-1981 or 1981-1982 school years. It held that its power 
under § 1415(e)(2) to grant "appropriate" relief upon review-
ing the contested IEP for the 1979-1980 school year included 
the power to grant relief for subsequent school years despite 
the lack of IEPs for those years. In this connection, how-
ever, the court interpreted the statute to place the burden of 
proof on the Town to upset the BSEA decision that the IEP 
was inappropriate for 1979-1980 and on the Panicos and the 
State to show that the relief for subsequent terms was 
appropriate. 
After a four-day trial, the District Court in May 1982 over-
turned the BSEA decision, holding that the appropriate 
1979-1980 placement for Michael was the one proposed by 
the Town in the IEP and that the parents had failed to show 
that this placement would not also have been appropriate for 
subsequent years. Accordingly, the Court concluded that 
the Town was "not responsible for the cost of Michael's edu-
cation at the Carroll School for the academic years 1979-80 
through 1981-82." 
In contesting the Town's proposed form of judgment em-
bodying the court's conclusion, Mr. Panico argued that, 
despite finally losing on the merits of the IEP in August 1982, 
he should be reimbursed for his expenditures in 1979-1980, 
that the Town should finish paying for the recently completed 
1981-1982 term, and that he should not be required to reim-
burse the Town for its payments to date, apparently because 
the school terms in question fell within the pendency of the 
administrative and judicial review contemplated by § 1415 
(e)(2). The case was transferred to another District Judge 
and consolidated with two other cases to resolve similar is-
sues concerning the reimbursement for expenditures during 
the pendency of review proceedings. 
In a decision on the consolidated cases, the Court rejected 
Mr. Panico's argument that the Carroll School was the "cur-
rent educational placement" during the pendency of the re-
view proceedings and thus that under § 1415(e)(3) the Town 
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was obligated to maintain that placement. The Court rea-
soned that the Panicos' unilateral action in placing Michael at 
the Carroll School without the Town's consent could not "con-
fer thereon the imprimatur of continued placement," even 
though strictly speaking there was no actual placement in 
effect during the summer of 1979 because all parties agreed 
Michael was finished with the Memorial School and the Town 
itself proposed in the IEP to transfer him to a new school in 
the fall. 
The District Court next rejected an argument, apparently 
grounded at least in part on a State regulation, that the 
Panicos were entitled to rely on the BSEA decision upholding 
their placement contrary to the IEP, regardless of whether 
that decision were ultimately reversed by a court. With 
respect to the payments made by the Town after the BSEA 
decision, under the State's threat to cut off funding, the court 
criticized the State for resorting to extrajudicial pressure to 
enforce a decision subject to further review. Because this 
"was not a case where the town was legally obligated under 
section 1415(e)(3) to continue payments preserving the status 
quo," the State's coercion could not be viewed as "the basis 
for a final decision on liability" and it could only be "regarded 
as other than wrongful ... on the assumption that the pay-
ments were to be returned if the order was ultimately 
reversed." The court entered a judgment ordering the 
Panicos to reimburse the Town for its payments for Michael's 
Carroll placement and related transportation in 1980-1981 
and 1981-1982. The Panicos appealed. 
In a broad opinion, most of which we do not review, the 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit remanded the case a 
second time. The court ruled, among other things, that the 
District Court erred in conducting a full trial de novo, that it 
gave insufficient weight to the BSEA findings, and that in 
other respects it did not properly evaluate the IEP. The 
court also considered several questions about the availability 
of reimbursement for interim placement. The Town argued 
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that § 1415(e)(3) bars the Panicos from any reimbursement 
relief, even if on remand they were to prevail on the merits of 
the IEP, because of their unilateral change of Michael's 
placement during the pendency of the § 1415(e)(2) proceed-
ings. The court held that such unilateral parental change of 
placement would not be "a bar to reimbursement of the par-
ents if their actions are held to be appropriate at final judg-
ment.'' In dictum the court suggested, however, that a lack 
of parental consultation with the Town or "attempt to achieve 
a negotiated compromise and agreement on a private place-
ment," as contemplated by the Act, "may be taken into 
account in a district court's computation of an award of eq-
uitable reimbursement." To guide the District Court on re-
mand, the court stated that "whether to order reimburse-
ment, and at what amount, is a question determined by 
balancing the equities." The court also held that the 
Panicos' reliance on the BSEA decision would estop the Town 
from obtaining reimbursement "for the period of reliance and 
requires that where parents have paid the bill for the period, 
they must be reimbursed." 
The Town filed a petition for a writ of certoriari in this 
Court challenging the decision of the Court of Appeals on 
numerous issues, including the scope of judicial review of the 
administrative decision and the relevance to the merits of an 
IEP of violations by local school authorities of the Act's pro-
cedural requirements. We granted certiorari only to con-
sider the following two issues: whether the potential relief 
available under § 1415(e)(2) includes reimbursement to par-
ents for private school tuition and related expenses, and 
whether § 1415(e)(3) bars such reimbursement to parents 
who reject a proposed IEP and place a child in a private 
school without the consent of local school authorities. We 
express no opinion on any of the many other views stated by 
the Court of Appeals. 
Congress stated the purpose of the Act in these words: 
')(· f 
84-433-0PINION 
8 BURLINGTON SCHOOL COMM. v. MASS. DEPT. OF ED. 
"to assure that all handicapped children have available to 
them . . . a free appropriate public education which em-
phasizes special education and related services designed 
to meet their unique needs [and] to assure that the rights 
of handicapped children and their parents or guardians 
are protected." § 1400(c). 
The Act defines a "free appropriate public education" to 
mean: 
"special education and related services which (A) have 
been provided at public expense, under public supervi-
sion and direction, and without charge, (B) meet the 
standards of the State educational agency, (C) include an 
appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school 
education in the State involved, and (D) are provided in 
conformity with [an] individualized education program." 
§ 1401(18). 
To accomplish this ambitious objective, the Act provides fed-
eral money to state and local educational agencies that under-
take to implement the substantive and procedural require-
ments of the Act. See Hendrick Hudson District Bd. of 
Education v. Rowley, 458 U. S. 176, 179-184 (1982). 
The modus operandi of the Act is the already mentioned 
"individualized educational program." The IEP is in brief a 
comprehensive statement of the educational needs of a· handi-
capped child and the specially designed instruction and 
related services to be employed to meets those needs. 
§ 1401(19). The IEP is to be developed jointly by a school 
official qualified in special education, the child's teacher, the 
parents or guardian, and, where appropriate, the child. In 
several places, the Act emphasizes the participation of the 
parents in developing the child's educational program and as-
sessing its effectiveness. See §§ 1400(c), 1401(19), 1412(7), 
1415(b)(l)(A), (C), (D), (E), and 1415(b)(2); 34 CFR § 300.345. 
Apparently recognizing that this cooperative approach 
would not always produce a consensus between the school of-
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ficials and the parents, and that in any disputes the school 
officials would have a natural advantage, Congress 
incoporated an elaborate set of what it labeled "procedural 
safeguards" to insure the full participation of the parents and 
proper resolution of substantive disagreements. Section 
1415(b) entitles the parents "to examine all relevant records 
with respect to the identification, evaluation, and educational 
placement of the child," to obtain an independent educational 
evaluation of the child, to notice of any decision to initiate or 
change the identification, evaluation, or educational place-
ment of the child, and to present complaints with respect to 
any of the above. The parents are further entitled to "an im-
partial due process hearing," which in the instant case was 
the BSEA hearing, to resolve their complaints. 
The Act also provides for judicial review in state or federal 
court to "[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision" 
made after the due process hearing. The Act confers on the 
reviewing court the following authority: 
"[T]he court shall receive the records of the adminis-
trative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at the 
request of a party, and, basing its decision on the pre-
ponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the 
court determines is appropriate." § 1415(e)(2). 
The first question on which we granted certiorari requires us 
to decide whether this grant of authority includes the power 
to order school authorities to reimburse parents for their ex-
penditures on private special education for a child if the court 
ultimately determines that such placement, rather than a 
proposed IEP, is proper under the Act. 
We conclude that the Act authorizes such reimbursement. 
The statute directs the court to "grant such relief as [it] 
determines is appropriate." The ordinary meaning of these 
words confers broad discretion on the court. The type of 
relief is not further specified, except that it must be "appro-
priate." Absent other reference, the only possible interpre-
tation is that the relief is to be "appropriate" in light of the 
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purpose of the Act. As already noted, this is principally to 
provide handicapped children with "a free appropriate public 
education which emphasizes special education and related 
services designed to meet their unique needs." The Act con-
templates that such education will be provided where possi-
ble in regular public schools, with the child participating as 
much as possible in the same activities as non-handicapped 
children, but the Act also provides for placement in private 
schools at public expense where this is not possible. See 
§ 1412(5); 34 CFR §§300.132, 300.227, 300.307(b), 300.347. 
In a case where a court determines that a private placement 
desired by the parents was proper under the Act and that an 
IEP calling for placement in a public school was inappropri-
ate, it seems clear beyond cavil that "appropriate" relief 
would include a prospective injunction directing the school 
officials to develop and implement at public expense an IEP 
placing the child in a private school. 
If the administrative and judicial review under the Act 
could be completed in a matter of weeks, rather than years, it 
would be difficult to imagine a case in which such prospective 
injunctive relief would not be sufficient. As this case so viv-
idly demonstrates, however, the review process is ponder-
ous. A final judicial decision on the merits of an IEP will in 
most instances come a year or more after the school term cov-
ered by that IEP has pass·ed. In the meantime, the parents 
who disagree with the proposed IEP are faced with a choice: 
go along with the IEP to the detriment of their child if it 
turns out to be inappropriate or pay for what they consider 
to be the appropriate placement. If they choose the latter 
course, which conscientious parents who have adequate 
means and who are reasonably confident of their assessment 
normally would, it would be an empty victory to have a court 
tell them several years later that they were right but that 
these expenditures could not in a proper case be reimbursed 
by the school officials. If that were the case the child's right 
to a free appropriate public education, the parents' right to 
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participate fully in developing a proper IEP, and all of the 
procedural safeguards would be less than complete. Be-
cause Congress undoubtedly did not intend this result, we 
are confident that by empowering the court to grant "appro-
priate" relief Congress meant to include retroactive re-
imbursement to parents as an available remedy in a proper 
case. 
In this Court, the Town repeatedly characterizes re-
imbursement as "damages," but that simply is not the case. 
Reimbursement merely requires the Town to belatedly pay 
expenses that it should have paid all along and would have 
borne in the first instance had it developed a proper IEP. 
Such a post-hoc determination of financial responsbility was 
contemplated in the legislative history: 
"If a parent contends that he or she has been forced, at 
that parent's own expense, to seek private schooling for 
the child because an appropriate program does not exist 
within the local educational agency responsible for the 
child's education and the local educational agency dis-
agrees, that disagreement and the question of who 
remains financially responsible is a matter to which the 
due process procedures established·under [the predeces-
sor to § 1415] appl[y]." S. Rep. No. 94-168, p. 32 (em-
phasis added). 
See 34 CFR § 300.403(b) (disagreements and question of 
financial responsibility subject to the due process 
procedures). 
Regardless of the availability of reimbursement as a form 
of relief in a proper case, the Town maintains that the 
Panicos have waived any right they otherwise might have to 
reimbursement because they violated § 1415(e)(3), which 
provides: 
"During the pendency of any proceedings conducted pur-
suant to [§ 1415], unless the State or local educational 
agency and the parents or guardian otherwise agree, the 
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child shall remain in the then current educational place-
ment of such child. . . . " 
We need not resolve the academic question of what Michael's 
"then current placement" was in the summer of 1979, when 
both the Town and the parents had agreed that a new school 
was in order. For the purposes of our decision, we as-
sume that the Pine Glen School, proposed in the IEP, was 
Michael's current placement and, therefore, that the Panicos 
did "change" his placement after they had rejected the IEP 
and had set the administrative review in motion. In so 
doing, the Panicos contravened the conditional command of 
§ 1415(e)(3)' that "the child shall remain in the then current 
placement." 
As an initial matter, we note that the section calls for 
agreement by either the State or the local educational 
agency. The BSEA's decision in favor of the Panicos and the 
Carroll School placement would seem to constitute agree-
ment by the State to the change of placement. The decision 
was issued in January 1980, so from then on the Panicos were 
no longer in violation of § 1415(e)(3). This conclusion, how-
ever, does not entirely resolve the instant dispute because 
the Panicos are also seeking reimbursement for Michael's ex-
penses during the fall of 1979, prior to the State's concur-
rence in the Carroll School placement. 
We do not agree with the Town that a parental violation of 
§ 1415(e)(3) constitutes a waiver of reimbursement. The 
provision says nothing about financial responsibility, waiver, 
or parental right to reimbursement at the conclusion of judi-
cial proceedings. Moreover, if the provision is interpreted 
to cut off parental rights to reimbursement, the principal 
purpose of the Act will in many cases be defeated in the same 
way as if reimbursement were never available. As in this 
case, parents will often notice a child's learning difficulties 
while the child is in a regular public school program. If the 
school officials disagree with the need for special education or 
the adequacy of the public school's program to meet the 
84-433-0PINION 
BURLINGTON SCHOOL COMM. v. MASS. DEPT. OF ED. 13 
child's needs, it is unlikely they will agree to an interim pri-
vate school placement while the review process runs its 
course. Thus, under the Town's reading of§ 1415(e)(3), the 
parents are forced to leave the child in what may turn out to 
be an inappropriate educational placement or to obtain the 
appropriate placement only by sacrificing any claim for 
reimbursement. The Act was intended to give handicapped 
children both an appropriate education and a free one; it 
should not be interpreted to defeat one or the other of those 
objectives. 
The legislative history supports this interpretation, favor-
ing a proper interim placement pending the resolution of dis-
agreements over the IEP: 
"The conferees are cognizant that an impartial due proc-
ess hearing may be required to assure that the rights of 
the child are completely protected. We did feel, how-
ever, that the placement, or change of placement should 
not be unnecessarily delayed while long and tedious ad-
ministrative appeals were being exhausted. Thus the 
conference adopted a flexible approach to try to meet the 
needs of both the child and the state." 121 Cong. Rec. 
37,412 (1975) (Sen. Stafford). 
We think at least one purpose of§ 1415(e)(3) was to prevent 
school officials from removing a child from the regular public 
school classroom over the parents' objection pending comple-
tion of the review proceedings. As we observed in Rowley, 
458 U. S., at 192, the impetus for the Act came from two fed-
eral court decisions, Pennsylvania Assn. for Retarded Chil-
dren v. Commonwealth, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (ED Pa. 1971), 
and 343 F. Supp. 279 (1972), and Mills v. District of Colum-
bia Board of Education, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D DC 1972), which 
arose from the efforts of parents of handicapped children to 
prevent the exclusion or expulsion of their children from the 
public schools. Congress was concerned about the appar-
ently widespread practice ofrelegating handicapped children 
to private institutions or warehousing them in special classes. 
84-433-0PINION 
14 BURLINGTON SCHOOL COMM. v. MASS. DEPT. OF ED. 
See § 1400(4); 34 CFR § 300.347(a). We also note that 
§ 1415(e)(3) is located in a section detailing procedural safe-
guards which are largely for the benefit of the parents and 
the child. 
This is not to say that § 1415(e)(3) has no effect on parents. 
While we doubt that this provision would authorize a court to 
order parents to leave their child in a particular placement, 
we think it operates in such a way that parents who unilat-
erally change their child's placement during the pendency of 
review proceedings, without the consent of state or local 
school officials, do so at their own financial risk. If the 
courts ultimately determine that the IEP proposed by the 
school officials was appropriate, the parents would be barred 
from obtaining reimbursement for any interim period in 
which their child's placement violated § 1415(e)(3). This con-
clusion is supported by the agency's intepretation of the Act's 
application to private placements by the parents: 
"(a) If a handicapped child has available a free appro-
priate public education and the parents choose to place 
the child in a private school or facility, the public agency 
is not required by this part to pay for the child's educa-
tion at the private school or facility .... 
"(b) Disagreements between a parent and a public 
agency regarding the availability of a program appropri-
ate for the child, and the question of financial respon-
sibility, are subject to the due process procedures under 
[§ 1415]." 34 CFR 300.403. 
We thus resolve the questions on which we granted certio-
rari; because the case is here in an interlocutory posture, we 
do not consider the estoppel ruling below or the specific eq-
uitable factors identified by the Court of Appeals for granting 
relief. We do think that the court was correct in concluding 
that "such relief as the court determines is appropriate," 
within the meaning of§ 1415(e)(2), means equitable relief. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
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Dear Bill: 
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Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
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.jnprtutt (!fourt 1tf tlft ~b .tiatte 
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April 22, 1985 
Re: 84-433 - School Committee of Burlington v. 
Department of Education 
Dear Bill, 
I am happy to accommodate your second point by changing 
the penultimate sentence of the opinion to read as follows: 
"We do think that the court was correct in 
concluding that 'such relief as the court 
determines is appropriate,' within the meaning of 
§1415(e) (2), means that equitable considerations 
are relevant in fashioning relief.n 
I hope this sub~titute language will meet your concerns. 
With respect to your first point, I think the opinion 
as currently written is faithful to the statutory scheme. 
Moreover, I must confess that I have some difficulty 
imagining a real-life situation in which the changes you 
propose will make any difference in allocating financial 
responsibility for interim placements. Accordingly, I am 
not disposed to make any changes on this point. 
Sincerel~ 
Justice Brennan 
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Burlington School Committee of the Town 
of Burlington v. Department of Education 
of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
Dear Bill, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Rehnquist 
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April 23, 1985 
No. 84-433 
School Committee of Burlington 
v. Department of Education 
Dear Bill, 
Thanks so much for your change in 
the penultimate sentence of the opinion. 
I withdraw my suggestion of the first 
point and join your opinion. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Rehnquist 
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